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PAVESICH, PROPERTY AND PRIVACY: THE
COMMON ORIGINS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
PRIVACY RIGHTS IN GEORGIA
MICHAEL B. KENT, JR.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Many modem-day Americans often think about rights in a
dualistic fashion. On one side of the divide is the body of law
that protects, enforces, and expands "human" or "personal
rights." Included here are venerable notions such as freedom of
expression and equal protection under the law, as well as rules
protecting an individual from personal injury and providing
basic fairness in the litigation process. On the other side of the
divide are so-called "property rights," consisting of those (often
arcane) requirements that define and regulate landed interests,
or whatever else an individual rightfully may call her own. In
the minds of many, these two categories - "personal rights" and
"property rights" - are separate and distinct. Indeed, some use
language suggesting that they are fundamentally at odds with
one another.'
For this reason, at first blush, it may seem a bit incongruous
to treat in a single volume both the right to privacy and the right
to property. After all, given our individualistic tendencies, the
right to privacy - long characterized as the right "to be let
alone ' 2 - perhaps qualifies as the archetypal "personal right" in
* Assistant Professor of Law, John Marshall Law School. I would like to

thank the editors and staff of the John Marshall Law Journal, especially
Amanda Gaddis and John Duncan, for their editorial and research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Constitution of the National Lawyers Guild, Preamble
(expressing goal that "human rights shall be regarded as more sacred than
property interests").
2. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d
ed. 1888) (coining phrase in context of physical touching); Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193,
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modern American thinking. As one scholar has commented,
"[p]rivacy is an abiding concern of the present age." 3 This
concern has become a fixed part of our culture, gaining traction
not only in the common law of tort, but also in public policy and
constitutional thought as well. The desire "to be let alone" has
found expression in outcries against governmental requests for
Internet data, 4 federal regulations protecting "health privacy," 5
and court decisions endorsing "the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life."6 Joining these ideas together with
issues about property may appear, if not inappropriate, then at
least a bit odd and out of place.
A deeper look, however, reveals that the two topics have very
much in common. Indeed, as the title to this essay suggests,
privacy rights and property rights derive from similar historical
and philosophical underpinnings. They share a common
structure, providing rules by which the law recognizes certain
interests as uniquely personal. Likewise, they share the common
goal of protecting those interests against interference by others,
including (to varying degrees) interference by the state itself.7
Moreover, in the words of one scholar, "they enjoy a mutually
reinforcing relationship" 8 - i.e., the right of privacy originates in
property-based ideas, whereas one of the functions of property
law is to protect private interests. Thus, property and privacy
should not be viewed as alien concepts; correctly understood,
"the two rights are intimately intertwined." 9
195 (1890) (employing phrase to describe broader right to privacy).
3. William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J.
CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10 (2002).
4. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Online Trail Can Lead to Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at C 1.
5. See generally 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162 & 164 (promulgating
"Privacy Rule" pursuant to Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996)).
6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
7. Radhika Rao, Property,Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L.
REV. 359, 418-28 (2000) (discussing substantive and structural similarities
between constitutional property and privacy rights).
8. Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
297, 302 (2003).
9. Rao, supra note 7, at 418. Indeed, some theorists, known as
"reductionists," argue that the fight to privacy is in fact nothing more than a
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II.

PA VESICH V. NEW ENGLAND LIFE INSURANCE Co.

The interconnection between property and privacy is
unmistakable when one considers how these rights have
developed in Georgia. And Georgia law (regarding this subject,
at any rate) is quite significant. In 1905, with the state Supreme
Court's unanimous decision in Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co.,' 0 Georgia became the first jurisdiction to
recognize privacy as a specific, remediable common-law right.
Pavesich arose when the defendant life insurance company
published a photograph of artist Paolo Pavesich in a newspaper
advertisement. The company had acquired the picture from an
Atlanta photographer, who gave it to the insurance company
without Pavesich's permission. In the advertisement, Pavesich
was portrayed as a vigorous and responsible individual that had
purchased life insurance from the company "in [the] healthy and
productive period of life."'" By virtue of this apparently
intelligent decision, the advertisement portrayed Pavesich as
resting easy, not only because his family would be protected
after his demise, but also because of the annual dividends he
received from the policies during his lifetime. 2 Next to the
picture of Pavesich, the advertisement contained the photograph
of "an ill-dressed and sickly looking person," who purportedly
did not have Pavesich's foresight and now, unable to secure
insurance, realized his mistake.' 3 Of course, the portrayal of
Pavesich was entirely fictitious, as he had neither purchased a
life insurance policy from the company nor made the statements
attributed to him. Thus, Pavesich complained that the
advertisement was "peculiarly offensive to him" and had a
tendency to "ridicule him before the world, and especially with
his friends and acquaintances" who knew the substance of the
4
advertisement to be false.1
label attached to other rights - most notably those of property and contract and, therefore, "is superfluous" as a separate legal doctrine. See Amy
Peikoff, No Corn on this Cobb: Why Reductionists Should be All Ears for
Pavesich, 42 BRANDEIS L. J.
751, 751-52 (2004).
10. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
11. Id. at 69.
12. Id.
13. Id. at68-69.
14. Id. at 69.
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As a result, Pavesich filed suit against the company, its
general agent, and the photographer. Although Pavesich
accused the defendants of acting maliciously in a manner that
adversely affected his reputation, he did not assert an explicit
action for defamation. Rather, Pavesich claimed that the
advertisement constituted a "trespass upon [his] right of
privacy."' 5 The trial court rejected this claim, a result that, given
the state of the legal landscape at the time, could not have been
too surprising for Pavesich's lawyer. Although some courts
previously had hinted that a right to privacy might exist, none
had explicitly recognized such a right as an independent ground
for legal action.
Indeed, the most prominent argument for an independent
privacy right came not from the case law, but rather from an
article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published more
than a decade earlier in the Harvard Law Review.' 6 In their
article, Warren and Brandeis had argued that "a general right to
privacy"' 7 could be gleaned from existing cases - most notably,
the common law's treatment of manuscripts, works of art, and
other types of intellectual property. 8 At the time Pavesich was
decided, however, no court of last resort had yet agreed.
In fact, the most famous court to have addressed the issue
refused to recognize an independent right of privacy on very
similar facts. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 9 the
New York Court of Appeals rejected a privacy claim brought by
a woman whose picture had been used, without her consent, on
flyers advertising the defendant's flour.2 0 Even though the lower
court had sustained her cause of action based on "the right to be
let alone," the Court of Appeals balked due to the lack of legal
precedent supporting such a right:
Mention of such a right is not to be found in Blackstone,
Kent, or any other of the great commentators upon the law;
nor, so far as the learning of counsel or the courts in this case
have been able to discover, does its existence seem to have
been asserted prior to about the year 1890, when it was
15. Id.
16. See generally Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 193-220.

17. Id. at 198.
18. Id. at 205.
19. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).

20. Id. at 442.
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presented with attractiveness, and no inconsiderable ability,
21
in the Harvard Law Review ....
Thus, the New York court insisted that the only authority for
recognizing a right to privacy was that offered by Warren and
Brandeis, and the precedents relied on by those authors
admittedly did not recognize a right to privacy as such. Rather
(as the Georgia Supreme Court would point out), all of the cases
on which Warren and Brandeis could have relied were "based
either upon the recognition of a right of property, or upon the
fact that the publication would be a breach of contract,
confidence, or trust.

' 22

By the time Paolo Pavesich's case

reached the Georgia high court, it faced a decidedly uphill
battle. The question confronting the court - a question which no
other court of last resort had answered affirmatively - was
"whether an individual has a right of privacy which he can
enforce, and which the court will protect against invasion."23
Answering that question in the affirmative, Justice Andrew J.
Cobb, writing for a unanimous court, made history.
Unfortunately, Pavesich has not always received the attention
it deserves. Many commentators have glossed over the decision
as a mere endorsement of the arguments made by Warren and
Brandeis, 24 arguments that some commentators have criticized
as unpersuasive and unsupported.25 But Pavesich did more. As
one scholar recently has posited, Pavesich "contributed
something crucial"2 6 to the debate over privacy - a justification
grounded not only in appeals to prior precedent or pragmatic
policy concerns, but in political and moral philosophy as well.27
Included in the Pavesich opinion are allusions to natural law
and social compact theory, references to Blackstone and his

21. Id. at 443.
22. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 75.
23. Id. at 69.
24. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386
(1960) (suggesting that Pavesich "accepted the views of Warren and
Brandeis"); see also Haeji Hong, Dismantlingthe PrivateEnforcement of the
PrivacyAct of 1974: Doe v. Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 75 (2005) (stating
that Pavesich "embraced the right to privacy set forth by Warren and
Brandeis").
25. See, e.g., Peikoff, supra note 9, at 773.
26. Id. at 755.
27. Id. at 783-91 (analyzing Pavesich decision).
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conception of absolute or fundamental rights, and the use of
precedent and language littered with deep-rooted, propertybased associations. These various elements of the opinion
supported legal recognition of a right to privacy in a manner
that was different from (and, in my opinion, more persuasive
than) what had come before.2 8 More importantly for present
purposes, a careful evaluation of these different elements, in
light of both prior and subsequent authority, demonstrates the
close relationship between the rights of privacy and property.
A. Natural Law and the Social Compact
Because no precedent affirmatively supported an independent
right of privacy, Justice Cobb and his colleagues on the Georgia
court had to look elsewhere for the foundations of their
argument. Importantly for our purposes, the first place they
turned was to the branch of political philosophy characterized
by social compact theory. "The individual," explained Justice
Cobb, "surrenders to society many rights and privileges which
he would be free to exercise in a state of nature, in exchange for
the benefits which he receives as a member of society."2 9 Thus,
at the outset, Justice Cobb grounded his analysis in the idea that
individuals enjoy certain rights under natural law, regardless of
any action or inaction by the state. Individuals agree to yield
some of these natural rights in order to promote the soundness
of the commonwealth (i.e., "as a member of society"), in
exchange for which they gain greater protection for those rights
retained by them. And Justice Cobb made clear that the
individual keeps certain fundamental rights bestowed by natural
law, even after having entered into political society:
But he is not presumed to surrender all those rights, and the
public has no more right, without his consent, to invade the
domain of those rights which it is necessarily to be presumed
he has reserved, than he has to violate the valid regulations
of the organized government under which he lives.3 °
For Justice Cobb, then, political society was founded upon an

28. Cf id. at 755 (noting that "it was not until after the Pavesich
decision that the movement in favor of the fight [to privacy] gained

momentum").
29. Pavesich, 50

30. Id.

S.E. at 69.
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agreement whereby each individual freely limits certain natural
rights (and concomitantly assents to the rules of the social
order) in exchange for the government offering him better
security for those rights that he continues to hold.
The question becomes, of course, whether the right to keep
certain matters private is included in those rights provided by
natural law and retained by the individual after entering the
social compact. Justice Cobb viewed the answer to this question
as obvious:
The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of
nature. It is recognized intuitively, consciousness being the
witness that can be called to establish its existence. Any
person whose intellect is in a normal condition recognizes at
once that as to each individual member of society there are
matters private, and there are matters public so far as the
individual is concerned. Each individual as instinctively
resents any encroachment by the public upon his rights
which are of a private nature as he does the withdrawal of
those of his rights which are of a public nature.3 1
For this reason, Justice Cobb understood the right of privacy to
derive from natural law.32 For him, it existed as a first principle,
and it was not surrendered (at least not entirely) by the social
compact made between the individual and society as a whole.
When viewed in this light, the right to privacy bears obvious
similarities to long-held notions about rights in property. As an
initial matter, Justice Cobb's explanation of the social compact
is virtually identical to the theories articulated more than two
centuries earlier by English philosopher John Locke. According
to Locke, all persons initially are in a state of nature, that is,
they are lacking organized political society.33 In this natural
state, people enjoy the freedom to decide for themselves how to
arrange their affairs, including the use and disposition of their
possessions and persons.3 4 So long as individuals remain in the
state of nature, however, this freedom lacks stability because
every individual enjoys the exact same freedom, with none
having authority to settle disputes or regulate conduct for the
31. Id. at 69-70.
32. Id. at 70-80.
33. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 4, at 8 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).
34. Id.
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mutual benefit of all.35 Accordingly, the rights enjoyed in the
state of nature are to some degree indefinite because they are
"constantly exposed to the invasion of others."3 6 To obtain
greater security for these rights, people unite together "for the
mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates," which
Locke calls "by the general name, propery.' 3 7 Thus, for Locke,
the primary purpose for which individuals create and submit to
formal government "is the preservationof their property."38 The
parallels between Locke's theory and Justice Cobb's discussion
in Pavesich are striking. For both, political society results from
individual desire to better protect those rights (whether property
or privacy) enjoyed by the laws of nature.
At the time Pavesich was written, these ideas enjoyed a long
pedigree in American legal thought, especially as applied to
property rights.3 9 Perhaps of primary importance were the
Georgia decisions that presumably would have influenced
Justice Cobb's thinking most directly. The law of eminent
domain, for example, was often explained by reference to the
social compact, pointing out that the individual tacitly agrees
(when necessary for the common good) to release his property
for public use, but only where the government upholds its tacit
agreement to provide just compensation for the taking.40 "All
property is a pledge to pay the necessary expenses of
government," said one Georgia court, "but the burthen must be
equally born."4 1 Thus, when the public good mandates the
yielding of individual property interests, those interests
35. Id. § 4, at 8; see also id. § 123, at 66.

36. Id. § 123, at 66.
37. Id. (emphases in original).
38. Id. § 124, at 66 (emphasis in original).
39. See, e.g., Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304,
310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (Paterson, Circuit Justice) (echoing Locke that
"preservation of property... is a primary object of the social compact");
Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 276 (1828) (Green, J.)
(stating that "security of private property... is one of the primary objects of
Civil Government").
40. See, e.g., Parham v. Justices of Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 344
(1851); see also Heard v. Callaway, 51 Ga. 314, 318 (1874) ("[I]t is contrary
to reason and justice, and to the fundamental principles of the social
compact, to take one man's property and give it to another without
compensation.") (emphasis added).
41. Parham,9 Ga. at 352.
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nonetheless receive protection in the form of remuneration to
the owner. This was so, said the Georgia courts, by virtue of the
social compact itself, even where no piece of positive legislation
expressly required it.42 As explained in another context,
"independently of written constitutions, there are restrictions
upon the legislative power, growing out of the nature of the civil
compact and the natural rights of man."4 3
These brief examples demonstrate that, by 1905, social
compact theory had long been associated with the law
pertaining to an individual's rights in property. A leading reason
for this association, as explained by an early Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, was because "[n]o man would
become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy
the fruits of his honest labour and industry."4 4 This idea, too,

was Lockean in nature. Just as Locke identified the social
compact with the preservation of individual property interests,
he identified property primarily with an individual's personhood
and labor. Locke asserted that "every man has a property in his
own person," which "no body has any right to but himself' and
which includes "It]he labour of his body, and the works of his
hands."45 Thus, by laboring, an individual extends the scope of
his property beyond himself to reach the things he produces:
"Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and
joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property."46 From the individual's vantage point, the social
compact is designed primarily to safeguard both those interests
he already has and those interests he might acquire, via his
labor, in the future.47

A similar rationale is implicit in Justice Cobb's promotion of
privacy rights. The notion that an individual possesses a
property interest in her person and labor logically leads to the
conclusion that she has some right to be protected from
interference by others - that is, to be let alone. With regard to
42.
43.
44.
Pa. 1795)
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 344-345; Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 41-42 (1847).
Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 369 (1852).
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D.
(Paterson, Circuit Justice).
LOCKE, supra note 33, § 27, at 19.
Id. (emphases in original).
Id. §§ 123-124, at 66.

John Marshall Law Journal

[Vol. II

the person itself, Locke's ideas "are inextricably linked to the
protection of privacy, because they suppose the ability to
exclude others from bodily invasion, suggesting that protection
of bodily privacy also involves a metaphor for ownership
itself."4 8 Moreover, Locke's theory suggests that an individual
might also possess some right in her own thoughts, affairs, and
personal information. In fact, one scholar has described Locke's
ideas as "the backbone of intellectual property law," which
protects "the individual who mixes her unique personality with
ideas, who most displays originality and novelty in her
creations. 4 9 It was in this area of the law that Warren and
Brandeis found their best analogy for a right to privacy." This
makes sense when one thinks in Lockean terms: "[I]ntellectual
property embodies Locke's idea that one gains a property right
in something when it emanates from one's self."5 Thus
understood, privacy (as an extension of one's personhood) plays
a very similar (if not identical) role to that of property with
regard to the nature of the social compact. Indeed, Pavesich
implied as much when it equated encroachments upon an
individual's privacy with the withdrawal of basic societal
benefits - that is, those benefits that induce the individual to
enter into the social compact in the first place. 2 If entering
political society necessarily meant that each individual forfeited
her right to keep certain matters private, Justice Cobb seemed to
be suggesting that no one would do it.
Although Pavesich does not make it explicit, it seems that it
is this similarity between property and privacy - the relative
value of each vis-A-vis the reasons for becoming a party to the
social compact - that (in the minds of Georgia jurists) linked
them together as deserving of legal protection. In this line of
thinking, individuals surrender certain rights (including in some
instances aspects of their rights to property and privacy) in order
to provide more stable and effective protection for their rights as
a whole. Chief among the rights retained, and for which
48. Katyal, supra note 8, at 303.
49. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087,
1112 (2002).
50. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 205.
51. Solove, supra note 49, at 1112.
52. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69-70 (Ga.
1905).
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protection is sought, are the bulk of each individual's property
and privacy interests. Unless these interests receive protection,
the social compact is violated and stands worthless to the
individual. For this reason, at least in Georgia, both property
and privacy were viewed early on as fundamental rights worthy
of recognition by any civilized society.53
B. Blackstone and FundamentalRights
For many Americans, the mention of fundamental rights
immediately invokes notions about an individual's entitlement
to "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness."54 For lawyers,
however, at least those schooled in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, fundamental rights often invoked a similar,
but slightly different, trinity - one penned not by Thomas
Jefferson55 but, rather, by Sir William Blackstone. In his
Commentaries on the Laws of England, which "grounded the
legal education of Founding-era Americans and remained
enormously important throughout the nineteenth century,"56
Blackstone identified three principal rights that belonged
naturally to all mankind, and belonged "in a peculiar and
emphatical manner" to the people of England.57 The first of
these rights, that of "personal security," encompassed an
individual's "legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation."58 The second
right, of "personal liberty," concerned "the power of
locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to
whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without
53. Id. at 80 (explaining that protection of privacy rights is
"thoroughly in accord.., with the principles of the law of every civilized
nation"); In re Flournoy, 1 Ga. 606, 608 (1846) (declaring legal protections
for vested property rights "to occupy a place in the estimation of civilized
states, anterior to, and above, constitutions and laws").
54. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

55. Of course, Jefferson was greatly influenced by Locke, who (as
demonstrated above) identified the purpose of the commonwealth with the
protection of its citizens' "lives, liberties, and estates." See LOCKE, supra
note 33, § 123, at 66.
56. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 559, 567 (2007).
57. 1 WILLIAM
ENGLAND * 129.

58. Id.

BLACKSTONE,
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imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law."5 9
Finally, Blackstone listed "the right of private property,"
consisting of "the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [an
individual's] acquisitions, without any control or diminution,
save only by the laws of the land." 60 These three categories
formed the core of an individual's private rights in eighteenthcentury English jurisprudence and, by extension, in the
understanding of most American lawyers through the close of
the nineteenth century.
Even a casual reading of Pavesich reveals that Justice Cobb
and his colleagues on the Georgia court concurred in this
understanding.
Immediately
after
discussing
privacy's
relationship to the social compact, Justice Cobb cited
Blackstone as additional support for his argument, explicitly
rooting the right of privacy in Blackstone's conceptions of
personal security and personal liberty. 6' Although Justice Cobb
conceded that Blackstone made no express reference to a right
of privacy, he maintained that the principles elucidated by the
great English jurist logically led to the discovery of such a right.
The idea of liberty, in particular, included sufficient room in
which to ground legally cognizable privacy interests:
"Liberty," in its broadest sense, as understood in this
country, means the right not only of freedom from servitude,
imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of one to use his
faculties in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will,
to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue
any lawful trade or avocation. Liberty includes the right to
live as one will, so long as that will does not interfere with
the rights of another or of the public. One may desire to live
a life of seclusion; another may desire to live a life of
publicity ....Each is entitled to a liberty of choice as to his
manner of life, and neither an individual nor the public
has a
62
right to arbitrarily take away from him this liberty.
Here, suggested Justice Cobb, lay the essence of the
individual's right to privacy.
At first blush, little about this analysis relates privacy to
property. Inasmuch as Justice Cobb rooted the right of privacy
59. Id. at* 134.
60. Id. at *129, *138.
61. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905).
62. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

No. 1]

Pavesich, Property and Privacy

in notions of security and liberty, he equally failed to mention
the third of Blackstone's fundamental rights - that of private
property. Should we conclude, then, that this portion of
Pavesich operates as a sort of breaking point, separating privacy
rights and property rights into distinct legal camps? Some
Georgia precedent, indeed, could be read to do just that,
describing the right of privacy as "an incident of the person, and
not of property."63 Such a separation, however, ignores the prior
precedent with which the Pavesich court must have been
familiar, as well as the examples utilized by Justice Cobb
himself. Properly considered, both sources demonstrate a deep
philosophical connection between privacy and property.
As an initial matter, Georgia courts had long embraced the
Blackstonian trinity, and rights to property clearly were
included alongside those of security and liberty. Indeed, early
Georgia courts seemingly viewed the three categories as
inseparable. In 1879, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court
followed Blackstone by grouping the rights of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property together as "the three
inherent, absolute rights of all men in civilized society. ' 64 Three
decades earlier, the court had approvingly quoted Justice
Story's famous opinion for the United States Supreme Court in
Wilkinson v. Leland, in which these rights again were
considered together: "The fundamental maxims of free
government seem to require, that the rights of personal security
and private property should be held sacred."65 More to the point
was the following passage from an 1851 opinion:
The right of accumulating, holding and transmitting
63. Hudson v. Montcalm Publ'g. Corp., 379 S.E.2d 572, 576 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989) (quoting McQueen v. Wilson, 161 S.E.2d 63, 65 (Ga. Ct. App.
1968), rev'd 162 S.E.2d 313 (Ga. 1968), overruled by Austin v. Carter, 285
S.E.2d 542 (Ga. 1982)).
64. Selma, Rome & Dalton R.R. Co. v. Gammage, 63 Ga. 604, 609

(1879).
65. In re Flournoy, 1 Ga. 606, 608 (1846) (quoting Wilkinson v.
Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829)). The Georgia court actually
misquoted Wilkinson, which reads: "The fundamental maxims of a free
government seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty and private
property should be held sacred." See Wilkinson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 657
(emphasis added). That the Georgia court could so easily substitute "personal
security" for "personal liberty" adds credence to the idea that these rights
were viewed as part and parcel one with another.
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property, lies at the foundation of civil liberty. Without it,
man nowhere rises to the dignity of a freeman. It is the
incentive to industry, and the means of independent action. It
is in vain that life and liberty are protected - that we are
entitled to trial by Jury, and the freedom of the press, and the
writ of habeas corpus - that we have unfettered entails, and
have abolished primogeniture - that suffrage is free, and that
all men stand equal under
the law, if property be held at the
66
will of the Legislature.
Thus, for Georgia jurists, as for the early American legal
culture in general,6 7 the rights of security, liberty, and property
were inextricably linked. 68 The mention of one, to some degree,
necessarily involved aspects of the others.
This interconnectedness is also seen prominently in two of
the examples utilized by Justice Cobb in Pavesich itself - the
right to choose one's calling and the right to live a life of
publicity. Although Justice Cobb classified these examples as
components of an individual's liberty, Georgia cases both
before and after Pavesich make clear that these rights have
connections to property as well. Only three years prior to
Pavesich, for example, the Georgia court explicitly linked an
individual's right to pursue a calling to both liberty and
property: "This right to choose one's calling is an essential part
of that liberty which it is the object of the government to
protect, and a calling, when chosen, is a man's property and
right."6 9 These ideas appear to have been nothing new to
66. Parham v. Justices of Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 355 (1851).
67. See James W. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or
Avocation": The Evolution of Unenumerated Economic Rights in the
Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 917, 917 (2006) ("There may have
been no eighteenth-century educated American who did not associate
defense of liberty with defense of property.") (quoting JOHN PHILLIP REID,
CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY

OF

THE

AMERICAN

REVOLUTION:

THE

AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 27 (1986)); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner-Era
Jurisprudenceand the American ConstitutionalTradition,70 N.C. L. REV. 1,

33 n.154 (1991) ("[I]n nineteenth-century America, property was considered
among the most important civil liberties.").

68. See also Walker v. City Council of Dawson, 66 S.E. 984, 986 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1910) (describing "personal liberty, personal security, and private
property" as "fundamental rights of the individual," which are "entirely

consistent and interdependent").
69. Brown v. Jacobs Pharm. Co., 41 S.E. 553, 560 (Ga. 1902)
(quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley,
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American thought on the subject. As early as 1792, James
Madison associated property rights with the freedom to choose
an occupation, explaining that such choices "not only constitute
[an individual's] property in the general sense of the word; but
are the means of acquiring property strictly so called."70 Thus,
an individual's right to choose his own lawful means of earning
a living was the product of both his right to liberty and his right
of property.
The same can be said for an individual's right of publicity.
For the Pavesich court, this right (and the correlative right of
privacy) resulted directly from the liberty "to live as one will."7 1
Subsequent Georgia decisions, however, demonstrate that
publicity rights are equally associated with property. In 1966,
for example, the Court of Appeals (following Dean Prosser) 2
explained that the right to privacy in reality encompasses four
separate causes of action: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's
seclusion or solicitude; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing
facts about the plaintiff; (3) public statements or depictions that
place the plaintiff in a false light; and (4) appropriation of the
plaintiff's name or likeness for the defendant's advantage.7 3
According to the court, this last cause of action (which,
incidentally, is the category in which the court would have
placed the claim of Paolo Pavesich) raised issues concerning an
individual's right of publicity.74 This right, said the court, is not
primarily about the personal feelings or sensibilities of the
plaintiff; rather, a cause of action based on publicity concerns
''an appropriation of rights in the nature of property rights for
commercial exploitation." 75 In a subsequent decision, the
Georgia Supreme Court tacitly agreed with this characterization,

J., dissenting)).
70. JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (1792), reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITuTION 598 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,

1987). For a thorough discussion of the association between property rights
and legal protections for occupational freedom, see generally Ely, supra note
67, at 921-49.
71. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905).
72. Prosser, supra note 24, at 389.
73. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 499-500 (Ga. Ct. App.

1966).
74. Id. at 503-04.
75. Id. at 504.
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describing the right of publicity in terms markedly similar to
those used in describing property rights: "The right of publicity
may be defined as a celebrity's right to the exclusive use of his
or her name and likeness."76 Thus, in addition to its connection
with liberty, the right of publicity-which Justice Cobb
understood as being the flip-side of the right of privacy-has a
proprietary dimension as well.
As with its tacit references to Locke and the social compact,
Pavesich's appeal to Blackstone's formulation of fundamental
rights shows that the right to privacy bears an inherent similarity
to longstanding notions about property. By grounding the right
to privacy in an individual's right of personal liberty, Justice
Cobb necessarily (if not overtly) connected privacy rights with
rights in property, since liberty and property were
"interdependent concepts."7 7 The United States Supreme Court

endorsed this same understanding of the Blackstonian trinity in
its famous opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, where it referred
to the "indefeasible right [singular] of personal security,
personal liberty and private property" as the source of the
privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
to the United States Constitution." Finally, the specific
examples of liberty interests utilized by Pavesich to support a
right of privacy - the right to pursue a calling and the right of
publicity - have been characterized by other Georgia courts in
terms generally associated with property interests, reinforcing
the conclusion that privacy and property have similar
characteristics and derive from similar ideas.
C. "The Bundle of Sticks" and "The Right to be Let Alone"
This similarity between privacy and property finds equal
support in the final thread of Pavesich's reasoning. After
connecting privacy to Blackstone's conception of fundamental
rights, Justice Cobb focused his attention on providing common
law support for "a legal right to be let alone."7 9 Although a
76. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am.
Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982) (emphasis added).
77. Ely, supra note 67, at 917.
78. 381 U.S. 479, 484 note (1965) (emphasis added; quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
79. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905)
(internal quotations omitted).
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surface reading of this portion of Pavesich might suggest that
property and privacy share little in common, a closer review
demonstrates that, in fact, Justice Cobb's argument in support of
a privacy right overflows with themes and language familiar to
the law of property.
Justice Cobb relied primarily on three common law examples
in support of the "right to be let alone." The first and second
both were found in the common law of nuisance-specifically,
the enjoining of noises under the law relating to private
nuisance and the punishment of a common scold, which the
common law treated as a public nuisance. For Justice Cobb, the
enjoining of noises (even those associated with lawful
occupations) that interfere with an individual's enjoyment of his
home presented "a conspicuous instance" of the law's
protection of privacy.8 0 With regard to such interferences,
Justice Cobb indicated that "there is really no injury to the
property, and the gist of the wrong is that the individual is
disturbed in his right to have quiet."8 1 So, too, the case of the
common scold or gossip. "[T]he reason for the punishment of
such a character," wrote Justice Cobb, "was not the protection
of any property right of her neighbors, but the fact that her
conduct was a disturbance of their right to quiet and repose...
*"82 As his third example, Justice Cobb pointed to the common
law right of persons to be secure from unreasonable searches
and seizures, in which he found implicit recognition for privacy
rights: "[T]he law on the subject.., cannot be based upon any
other principle than the right of a person to be secure from
invasion by the public into matters of a private nature, which
can only be properly termed his right of privacy." 83
As indicated above, Justice Cobb's analysis, at first blush,
does not seem to support the thesis proffered in this essay - that
privacy and property share similar underpinnings. After all,
Justice Cobb seemed to go out of his way to show that the
referenced doctrines in reality implicated no property right at
all, thus bolstering his implication that the law must be
protecting something else (in a word, privacy). But Justice
Cobb's description of these cases as not involving property
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71-72.
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seems more polemical than doctrinal.
It is difficult to believe, for example, that Justice Cobb and
his colleagues really could not find "any other principle" than
privacy on which to base the law's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the analogous context of
the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures extends to both privacy and property
interests.84 Moreover, just five years after Pavesich, the Georgia
Court of Appeals connected the law of search and seizure
directly with the "proud boast of the Anglo-Saxon that a man's
home is his castle," such that the government officials who
invaded the defendant's home "committed a double trespass - a
trespass against [the defendant's] personal security, and a
trespass against his private property." 85
Additionally, the nuisances referenced by Justice Cobb
implicate property rights, despite his objections to the contrary.
With regard to either nuisance, be it a bothersome noise or a
common scold, the law's primary concern seems to be the
promotion of quiet enjoyment, a notion usually associated with
property rights.8 6 In the first case, the law seeks to protect from
the bothersome noise an adjacent landowner's right to use,
control, and enjoy his neighboring parcel, as well as to maintain
the value of that parcel in the event of transfer. 87 Although not
as easily seen, comparable interests are at issue in the case of
the common scold. There, the public at large exercises
84. See, e.g., Sodal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62-63 (1992).
85. Walker v. City Council of Dawson, 66 S.E. 984, 986-87 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1910).
86. See, e.g., Thumbley v. Hightower, 184 S.E. 331, 332 (Ga. Ct. App.
1936) ("The right to enjoyment of private property is an absolute right of

every citizen, and every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such
enjoyment gives rise to a cause of action. Any act which deprives the owner
of personal property of the peaceful and quiet possession of such property is
a tort for which the injured party may maintain an action.").
87. See, e.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. London, 76 S.E. 306, 308 (Va. 1912)
("A private nuisance is the using or authorizing the use of one's property, or
of anything under one's control, so as to injuriously affect an owner or
occupier of property (1) by diminishing the value of that property; (2) by
continuously interfering with his power of control or enjoyment of that
property; (3) by causing material disturbance or annoyance to him in his use
or occupation of that property.").
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dominion and control over individuals who interfere with the
quiet enjoyment of general society, so as to preserve the social
order against habitual disturbances of the peace.88 In other
words, in punishing the common scold, the law protects the
right of each member of society to use, occupy, and enjoy the
general functioning of that society in a quiet and peaceable
manner, free from persistent interference with or disturbance of
that right. When framed in this way, these nuisances appear to
have been protecting interests similar to those associated with
the well-worn metaphor of property as a "bundle of sticks" i.e., an aggregation of component rights relating primarily to the
possession, use, and disposition of the thing at issue, as well as
the exclusion of others from exercising similar rights.89 And this
understanding of property as the rights of the owner in relation
to a thing, rather than simply the thing itself, was already
established at the time Justice Cobb penned Pavesich. In 1866,
for example, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia declared:
Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy, and
dispose of a thing. The term, although frequently applied to
the thing itself, in strictness means only the rights in relation
to it. And, indeed, after a most careful examination of all the
authorities within my reach, I have failed to discover a
definition of "property" stripped of the attributes of
enjoyment and alienation .... The exclusive right of using
and transferring property follows as a natural consequence
from the perception and admission of the right itself.90
Twelve years after Pavesich, this view was explicitly
endorsed by the Georgia Supreme Court, which cited the abovereferenced passage for the following proposition: "The term

88. See, e.g., State v. Paledrano, 293 A.2d 747, 748 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1972) ("A common scold is a troublesome and angry woman, who,
by brawling and wrangling among her neighbors, breaks the public peace,
increases discord, and becomes a nuisance to the neighborhood.");
Commonwealth v. Barrett, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 462, 463 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Bucks

County 1969) (same).
89. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 435 (1982); Rabun County v. Mountain Creek Estates LLC, 632
S.E.2d 140, 143 (Ga. 2006).
90. Ex parte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 7 (S.D. Ga. 1866) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
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'property' is a very comprehensive one, and is used not only to
signify things real and personal owned, but to designate the
right of ownership, and that which is subject to be owned and
enjoyed."9 When "property" is viewed in these terms, it is
difficult to uphold Justice Cobb's statements in Pavesich that
the referenced nuisances affect no property rights at all.
Indeed, a closer look at Pavesich reveals that privacy's "right
to be let alone" shares much in common with the figurative
"bundle of sticks" that characterizes our concept of property.
Although in places, Pavesich appeared to reject the idea that
property theory provides a basis for the right of privacy, other
portions of the opinion clearly suggested otherwise. Perhaps the
most striking example occurred in connection with Justice
Cobb's discussion of the New York case of Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co. After criticizing the majority's
failure to recognize a right of privacy in that case, Justice Cobb
quoted extensively from the dissenting opinion in Roberson,
which itself was rife with property-based language.9 2 First, the
Roberson dissent rooted the right of privacy in an individual's
entitlement "to be protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment
of that which is his own," 93 language that has obvious
similarities to the conception of property as an amalgam of
rights relating to one's exclusive use and possession of a
particular thing. Second, the Roberson dissent repeatedly noted
the commercial context of that case, which (like Pavesich) arose
from the defendant's unauthorized use of the plaintiff's likeness
in advertisements for the defendant's product.94 Implicit in this
discussion was the idea that the plaintiff (and she only) had the
ability to profit from her likeness, suggesting that she also
possessed the exclusive right to alienate or otherwise transfer
that ability. Finally, and most obviously, the Roberson dissent
directly equated property and privacy as flowing from
analogous ideas:
91. Wayne v. Hartridge, 92 S.E. 937, 939 (Ga. 1917).
92. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78-79 (Ga.
1905).
93. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 561 (N.Y.
1902) (Gray, J., dissenting). This portion of Judge Gray's dissent was quoted
in Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 78.
94. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 563-64, 566 (Gray, J., dissenting). These
portions of Judge Gray's dissent were quoted in Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 78-79.
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Property is not, necessarily, the thing itself which is owned;
it is the right of the owner in relation to it. The right to be
protected in one's possession of a thing or in one's
privileges, belonging to him as an individual, or secured to
him as a member of the commonwealth, is property, and as
such entitled to the protection of the law .... It seems to me
that the principle which is applicable is analogous to that
upon which courts of equity have interfered to protect the
right of privacy in cases of private writings, or of other
unpublished products of the mind.95
Not only did Pavesich quote all of these statements, what's
more, it explicitly adopted the reasoning of the Roberson dissent
as its own.96

For this reason, despite its own suggestions to the contrary,
Pavesich once again demonstrates that property and privacy
share similar underpinnings. Just as property demarcates an
individual's rights in the exclusive use, possession, and
disposition of a thing, the right of privacy concerns an
individual's rights to the exclusive use, possession, and
disposition of her uniquely personal attributes. Put differently,
both property rights and privacy rights are concerned primarily
with the concept of sovereignty - that is, who has authority to
decide whether, how and when to utilize some distinctive thing,
feature, idea, characteristic, or piece of information. Just as the
right to exclude others is essential to the concept of property, 97
so, too, is it essential to the concept of privacy. In either case,
the ability to prohibit others from engaging in certain behavior
vis-a-vis some interest declared to be personal to the holder is
largely what defines the right itself. As one scholar has
explained: "The core of both "privacy' and 'property' involves
the same abstract right: the right to exclude unwanted
interference by third parties."9
95. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 564 (Gray, J.,dissenting). This portion of
Judge Gray's was quoted in Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 78-79.
96. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 79.
97. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)
(calling right to exclude "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights commonly characterized as property"); Thomas W. Merrill, Property
and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (calling right to
exclude "the sine qua non" of property).
98. Bruce Ackerman, LiberatingAbstraction, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 317,
347 (1992). Not surprisingly, in the Fourth Amendment context, the United
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III. CONCLUSION
Pavesich and its progeny demonstrate that privacy rights and
property rights are similar creatures with similar philosophical
and historical origins. As traditionally understood, an
individual's right to either property or privacy derives from
natural law, and it is the procuring of protection for these rights
that induce the individual to enter the social compact and form
political society with others. Moreover, both property and
privacy are rooted in those fundamental rights that have formed
the core of Anglo-American legal thought since the time of
Blackstone. Finally, despite its disjointed protestations to the
contrary, Pavesich demonstrates that privacy and property
operate in similar fashion to protect an individual's exclusive
right to control interests deemed by the law to be his own.
Therefore, it is not at all peculiar to conceive of privacy and
property as interconnected; as stated above, "the two rights are
intimately intertwined." 99 Indeed, the more peculiar thinking
may be that mentioned at the outset of this essay - viewing
personal rights and property rights as distinct (and perhaps
conflicting) interests. A careful look at the Pavesich opinion and
the similarities it reveals between privacy and property,
however, should diminish (if not dispel) such dualistic notions.
As the United States Supreme Court has instructed: "[T]he
dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights."1 "
In the comparable origins, structures and purposes of privacy
rights and property rights, this statement finds one of its clearest
expressions.

States Supreme Court has directly associated the right to exclude with an
individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
99. Rao, supra note 7, at 418.
100. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).

